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I. INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation in December 2002 is the
biggest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history.' The Houston-based
company, formed in 1985, became the nation's seventh-largest company in
revenue by buying electricity from generators and selling it to consumers.2
Because Enron made the market 3 in energy trading, its collapse
fundamentally altered the U.S. energy trading industry. Equally important,
the disclosure of Enron's role in California's power market crisis shattered
confidence in deregulated wholesale-electricity and natural gas markets,
creating obstacles for new players seeking to restore confidence in energy
trading markets.4 New market entrants offer their clients a more complete
contracting environment, self-regulate with more transparent risk
* Alexia Brunet, J.D., Ph.D. is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law and Special Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. She
is the contacting author: a-brunet@ law.northwestem.edu.
** Meredith Shafe, J.D., is an associate at Chapman and Cutler LLP and a 2006 graduate
of Northwestern University School of Law.
1 See CNN.com, Explaining the Enron Bankruptcy, (Jan. 13, 2002) available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/12/enron.qanda.focus/ (noting that its stock, worth more
than $80 about a year ago, has tumbled to less than $1 per share. Enron's collapse left
investors burned and thousands of employees out of work with lost retirement savings).
2 Id.
3 To "make a market" means "to be ready, willing and able to buy or sell a particular
security as a dealer. The individual who does this is called a specialist, if the security is
listed, or a market maker, if the security is traded over-the-counter." Investorwords.com,
Make a Market, http://www.investorwords.com/2924/make a_market.html (last visited Mar.
28, 2007).
4 Rebecca Smith, Enron Continues to Haunt the Energy Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
2006, at C2 ("Enron created high sensitivity to the notion of market abuse." (quoting
Gordon van Welie, chief executive of ISO New England Inc., an organization concerned
with regional electric reliability)).
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management policies, and face more investigative and prosecution efforts
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC").5 Nevertheless, the
imprint of Enron's demise continues to haunt energy markets and energy-
related derivatives.6
In this article we recount the development of energy derivative trading
markets in the United States, Enron's role in the industry's development,
and the ways in which Enron's demise and the surrounding events
influenced the structure and regulation of energy trading.7 If not for the
furor and suspicions raised by Enron, particularly surrounding the
California energy crisis, legislative proposals currently in Congress that
seek to limit the role of energy derivatives would have seemed unlikely, if
not illogical, when first introduced.8
Today, energy-related derivatives are a multi-billion dollar market 9
and an important means of transferring financial risks associated with price
volatility inherent in commodity markets.' 0 Derivatives are contracts or
securities that derive their value from the price of an underlying risk factor
or asset, such as the price of a commodity or Treasury bond.' By using
derivatives, the risk in any given contract can be separated into manageable
pieces and spread among others capable of absorbing it.' 2  Market
participants trade in derivatives either to hedge a risk to which their income
5 Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n., Restoring Confidence in U.S. Energy Trading
Markets (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter Energy White Paper], available at
http://www.isda.org/press/pdf/isdaenergywhitepaper.pdf.
6 See Smith, supra note 4, at C1.
7 For purposes of this paper, "regulation" of energy trading will be limited to federal
legislation and agency regulation of energy trading-i.e., energy futures and options
contracts and over-the-counter energy derivative contracts.
8 See Smith, supra note 4, at C1.
9 See Congressman Bart Stupak, Stupak Re-Introduces PUMP Act, (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://www.house.gov/list/press/miOl-stupak/PUMPAct0 11907.html.
10 See DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DERIVATIVES AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN
THE PETROLEUM, NATURAL GAS, AND ELECTRICITY INDUSTRIES (Oct. 2002), § 6:1,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/derivative/pdf/srsmg(2002)0 I .pdf [hereinafter Energy
Industry Derivatives Report]; Andrea M.P. Neves, Wholesale Electricity Markets and
Products After Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE
COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 91 (Christopher L. Culp & William
A. Niskanen eds., Wiley, 2003).
11 Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 195, 195 (1995).
12 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Speech at the American Bankers
Association Annual Convention (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BOARDDOCS/Speeches/2004/20041005/default.htm [hereinafter Greenspan Speech]
(noting the development of derivatives by the banking industry as a precursor to the
development of energy derivatives); Karol, supra note 11, at 196-98.
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is exposed or to speculate in changes in energy market conditions.' 3 When
trades use derivatives as risk management mechanisms, they do so to
eliminate exposures to the energy market fluctuation.
Energy-related derivatives were developed long before the collapse of
Enron, in response to price volatility caused by economic conditions and
deregulation in the energy industry. A key feature to note is that energy
demand is price inelastic, meaning that demand for energy is not very
responsive to price. Beginning with the OPEC oil embargo and subsequent
oil shortages in the 1970s, energy price volatility took on new dimensions
from a more stable regime that dominated the market since World War 11.14
In addition to the oil shocks, the deregulation of natural gas and electricity
markets in the United States beginning in the 1980s added more volatility
as prices were allowed to fluctuate with economic conditions rather than be
fixed by a regulator.' 5 Although evidence suggests that deregulation made
the wholesale energy markets for natural gas and power become more
competitive in this period, price volatility greatly affected retail utility
suppliers, industrial clients, and energy companies themselves. Energy
derivatives emerged as a method for energy buyers to offload some of the
risk of the price volatility.
The newly deregulated, newly volatile energy industry followed the
example of the banking industry, which had already developed financial
derivatives to hedge against interest rate and currency exchange
fluctuations. Derivatives had revolutionized banking, providing the ability
to offload risk and quantify costs with a high degree of certainty.'6 Energy
users hoped that the same could be achieved in the new energy markets.
The CFTC oversees the enforcement of exchange rules, conducts
surveillance of trading in commodities futures and related cash markets,
17
and is the authority for regulated derivatives in the nation. 8 With CFTC
13 See Karol, supra note 11, at 196-98.
14 See PHILIP K. VERLEGER, JR., ADJUSTING TO VOLATILE ENERGY PRICES 129 (1993).
15 Karol, supra note 11, at 197-98.
16 See Greenspan Speech, supra note 12 (noting that relative success of U.S. banks during
the recent recession and stating, "better risk management may be the only truly necessary
element of success in banking."); see also PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS,
OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, (Nov. 9,
1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf [hereinafter
PWG Report] ("One of the most dramatic changes in the world of finance during the past
fifteen years has been the extraordinary development of the markets for financial derivatives.
Over-the-counter derivatives have transformed the world of finance, increasing the range of
financial products available to corporations and investors and fostering more precise ways of
understanding, quantifying, and managing risk.").
17 See infra, Part II.C.
18 Walter L. Lukken & James A Overdahl, Financial Product Fundamentals: A Guide For
Lawyers (Practicing Law Institute) § 18:5, The Regulation of Derivative Products (Feb.
2004); see also Andrea S. Kramer, Paul J. Pantano, Jr., & Doron F. Ezickson, Regulation of
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approval, energy derivatives developed as a business serving to ensure
adequate and efficient supply or energy units at a pre-contracted price.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan refers to them as
indispensable to improved risk management practices and crediting them
with the enhanced resilience of financial institutions in the United States.'
9
In the energy market, the role of a derivative in risk management, price
discovery, and market liquidity functions helps to support and protect vital
national services during times of volatility.
20
Enron changed all of this. The collapse incited a public outcry against
the wild free market of trading, viewed by most casual observers as
speculative and manipulative. And yet, the vast depth of demand for
energy-related derivative instruments left the market asking for recovery
and the public (and thus politicians) demanding oversight. Regulation
frameworks have been debated ever since.
This article examines three main themes illustrating how Enron's
collapse relates to features of the current policy environment regulating
energy trading. Section II presents the regulation of energy trading
contracts and derivatives, CFTC oversight of futures markets and
enforcement procedures. Second, Section III discusses the regulatory
structure during Enron's ascent, including discussions of the Commodities
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, and Enron's role in the rise of energy
trading. Third, Section IV presents the impact of Enron's collapse on
energy market regulation, introducing the rise of agency investigations and
enforcement actions, political responses, and legislation, as well as market
responses. Section V discusses present concerns facing the energy trading
industry such as the CFTC Reauthorization of 2005, the PUMP ACT, Oil
and Gas Traders Oversight Act, as well as recent industry responses to calls
for additional natural gas legislation. Section VI provides concluding
remarks.
Wholesale Electricity Trading After Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS, 113-16
(Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003).
19 Lukken & Overdahl, supra note 18.
20 This is just a very brief summary of the basic role of derivatives in energy markets.
The scope of this paper does not afford a detailed discussion of the economic functions of
derivatives in energy markets. For a more in-depth discussion, see Commodities Futures
Trading Comm'n, The Economic Purpose of Futures Markets (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/brochures/opaeconpurp.htm [hereinafter CFTC Brochure]; Energy
Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10.
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II. REGULATING ENERGY TRADING CONTRACTS AND
DERIVATIVES
Energy derivatives are financial instruments whose value is linked to
the price fluctuation of an energy product.21 In the United States, energy
derivative contracts are traded primarily in two markets.22  Derivatives
traded on an exchange are called exchange-traded derivatives and contracts
entered into through private negotiation are typically called off-exchange or
over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives. Contracts traded in each market
share similar risk-shifting attributes, but the means by which the contracts
are negotiated and the information, liquidity, and counterparty risks can
differ. 2  These products serve similar economic functions, and are
somewhat fungible; however, they are not perfect substitutes and thus they
also complement each other.25
The United States has regulated derivatives trading for many years.26
Regulation varies by the type of derivative product and the parties involved
(e.g., a bank, an insurance company, or another regulated entity).27 Energy
trading markets include both regulated futures markets and unregulated
derivatives markets, and thus, are not governed by a uniform set of trading
rules. Moreover, an energy trading transaction can be subject to a particular
condition depending on the type of derivative product involved.28
Regulation of energy futures is basically straight-forward and settled-
trading is conducted on exchanges, such as the NYMEX, subject to
exchange rules and CFTC regulation. Futures and options markets
(exchange-traded derivatives) are regulated through self-regulation by the
exchanges and oversight by the CFTC.29
21 Mark Jickling, Regulation of Energy Derivatives, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2006) [hereinafter CRS
Report], http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06May/RS21401.pdf; Karol, supra note 11,
at 198.
22 CRS Report, supra note 2 1, at 1.
23 Id. Futures and options are the most widely-traded derivatives on regulated exchanges.
24 Karol, supra note 11, at 198.
25 Id.
26 Charles M. Seeger, The Development of Congressional Concern about Financial
Futures Markets, in FUTURES MARKETS: REGULATORY ISSUES 1, 4-18 (Anne E. Peck ed.,
1985).
27 Energy Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10, at 48.
28 For example, aspects of wholesale electricity trading are subject to the overlapping
jurisdiction of both the FERC and CFTC. As a result, electricity market participants "face a
dizzying array of existing and proposed regulatory requirements." Kramer et al., supra note
18, at 106-29.
29 See, e.g., Energy Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10, at 48.
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A. Exchange-traded (Regulated) Derivatives
Exchange-traded derivatives are standardized contracts traded through
a regulated exchange.30 The New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX")
offers futures contracts for crude oil, natural gas, heating oil, and gasoline,
and it is the busiest regulated exchange in the country. 31 The primary
features of contracts offered b exchanges are standardization, a trading
platform and a clearing system. Standardization ensures that all contracts
for a particular commodity and a particular date are the same, and can thus
be traded indistinguishably. 33 Consequently, futures contracts are traded
between parties who never directly negotiate with each other.34
Standardization has some advantages in that the large numbers of market
participants trading the same instrument facilitates hedging. 35 At the same
time, the standardization of futures contracts reduces their merchandising
attractiveness in that it cannot be tailored to individual party positions.36
The trading platform is the mechanism by which buyers and sellers are
brought together and orders are matched. A clearinghouse becomes the
buyer to the seller and the seller to the buyer, thereby facilitating the
process by which parties enter into and exit contracts, and making the
contract liquid.37  Moreover, contracting with the clearinghouse protects
exchange participants from the credit risk of entering into derivatives
contracts directly with another counterparty and assures the financial
integrity of the contracts.38
Commodity futures contracts, such as those traded on the NYMEX,
are regulated by the CFTC under the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA").
39
Commodity futures contracts are not explicitly defined in the CEA or CFTC
regulations; thus, there has been much discussion about what actually
constitutes such a contract. While the CEA requires all trading in
commodity futures contracts to comply with CFTC regulations and be
conducted only on a designated contract market in accordance with the
market rules, 40 neither the statute nor the CFTC regulations explicitly define
30 id.
31 CRS Report, supra note 21, at 1.
32 Energy Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10, at 47.
33 Id.; see also Karol, supra note 11, 198-99
34 CFTC Brochure, supra note 20.
35 id.
36 Id.
37 Energy Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10, at 47.
38 Id.; see also Energy White Paper, supra note 5, at 11-12.
39 Energy White Paper, supra note 5, at 6.
40 See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971) (A commodity
"futures contract must be satisfied or liquidated by (1) an opposite and offsetting transaction
in the same future prior to the expiration of trading in that future, or by (2) delivery of the





what a commodity futures contract is or what those market rules are.
Thus, the CEA allows courts and legislators to determine the limits of the
CFTC's regulatory authority in terms of deciding which contracts fall
within the meaning of the statute.42
Courts agree that in interpreting the phrase "contracts for sale of a
commodity for future delivery," over which the Commission has regulatory
jurisdiction, there is no definitive list of the elements of futures contracts.
However, courts abide by the rule that the transaction must be viewed as a
whole with a critical eye toward its underlying purpose.4 3 Courts recognize
certain elements as common to such contracts. For instance, courts have
defined commodity futures contracts as agreements for the purchase or sale
of a commodity for delivery in the future at a price that is established when
the contract is initiated, with both parties to the transaction obligated to
fulfill the contract at the specified price, subject to applicable institutional
rules such as those of the Chicago Board of Trade.44 The CFTC has added
to these factors, including whether the parties are commercially
sophisticated and can bear extra risk, and whether the transaction is
structured so that the risk can be magnified before its completion.45
during the specified delivery month and in conformity with the rules of the Board of
Trade.").
41 The CEA defines the terms "commodity" and "future delivery" but does not define the
phrase "contracts for sale of a commodity for future delivery." Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C.S. § l(a) (2006); Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, What Are Contracts of Sale of a
Commodity for Future Delivery Within Meaning of Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C.A. §§
1 et seq.), 182 A.L.R. FED. 559, 559 (2002).
42 See Cargill, Inc., 452 F.2d 1154, at 1154.
43 CFTC v. Co. Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F. 2d 573 (1982). See also Transnor
(Bermuda), Ltd. v. BP North America Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y 1990),
Andersons, Inc., v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F. 3d 308, 318 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
courts must look at "whether there is a legitimate expectation that physical delivery.., will
occur in the future"), Lachmund v. ADM Investor Serv., Inc., 191 F. 3d 777, 788 (7th Cir.
1999) (stating that courts will not only look at the contract itself but also at prior dealings
between parties); In re Cargill, Inc., [2000-2002 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) P 28, 425, at 51, 225 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 22, 2000) (recognizing that the CFTC continues
to adhere to multifactor, holistic approach).
44 See id. However, courts have noted that as a matter of reality and practice rarely does
a commodity futures dealer actually intend to take or make delivery on the commodity. See,
e.g., Lauzon, supra note 41, at 576.
45 Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg., 39, 188, 39,
191 & n. 10 (Sept. 25, 1990). Characteristics include: (1) if the contract was "entered into
for commercial purposes related to the business of a producer, processor, fabricator, refiner
or merchandiser who may wish to purchase or sell a commodity for deferred shipment or
delivery in connection with the conduct of its business;" (2) if the contract was entered into
"to shift future price risks incident to commercial operations and other forward
commitments;" (3) if the counterparties "have the capacity to make or take delivery;" (4) if
the contract was an "individually and privately negotiated principal-to-principal
transaction[];" (5) if the contract could not be assigned "without the consent of the parties,
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:665 (2007)
B. Over-the-Counter Markets
Since the explosion of energy derivatives products over the past few
years, over-the-counter ("OTC") trading, or activity that does not take place
on an exchange,46 accounts for the majority of the energy trading industry.47
In contrast to the standardized terms and regulated environment of
exchange-traded derivatives, OTC derivatives are not standardized-they
are essentially contracts between two parties, the terms of which vary based
on party demands.48 For example, some sophisticated traders create hybrid
instruments to take advantage of particular trading opportunities. 49 There
are benefits to negotiating contract terms in that parties can reduce risk by
assuring that the terms of the derivative contract more closely match the
characteristics of their physical market positions. However, the advantage
of customization comes at the expense of the liquidity and credit assurances
offered by exchange-traded derivatives. 5°
OTC trading takes place largely on electronic exchanges such as the
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). In the OTC market, firms act as dealers,
trading individually negotiated derivatives contracts with other market
participants, such as banks, hedge funds, and energy companies, all in an
effort to reduce their risk exposure to energy prices. 51 The flexibility
allowed in these markets has led to a large volume of daily trades between
52parties. However, in OTC transactions that are not cleared, each party to
the transaction assumes the risk that their counterparty will be in a financial
condition to execute the contract on the date of expiration-i.e., credit
and [did] not provide for exchange-style offset;" (6) if the contract was not subject to
variation margining or to clearinghouse and settlement systems; and (7) if the contract was
entered into "with the expectation that delivery of the actual commodity will eventually
occur through performance on the contract." Id. at 39, 191 & n. 10.
46 See PWG Report, supra note 16.
47 To illustrate, one source estimated that currently, only about 25 to 35 percent of all
energy commodities trading occurs on NYMEX. In the early stages of the energy trading
industry, NYMEX energy futures accounted for a more significant share of the industry. See
Stupak, supra note 9.
48 Id.
49 Derivatives that deviate from the basic structures described below are usually referred
to as "exotic" derivatives. Exotics are often just combinations of two or more of the other
forms of derivative, such as a "swaption," a combination of a swap and an option. See Adam
R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the
Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1994).
50 Energy Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10, at 48.
51 CRS Report, supra note 21, at 2. Technically, over-the-counter derivatives can be
entered into between any two counter-parties. In practice however, the market has come to
be structured as a dealer market.
52 Id. Swaps are always traded over-the-counter, as are all exotic derivatives. Options
are traded over-the-counter as well as on exchanges, usually depending on the nature of the
underlying commodity. Also, most natural-gas trading occurs over-the-counter.
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risk.53 In contrast, by trading on an exchange, which screens the quality of
market participants, futures traders are free to transact without this concern.
This concern was brought to the forefront of the industry after the failure of
Enron and other major trading parties. As a result, new electronic trading
markets provide clearing services to OTC trading parties.54
The OTC market differs from conventional markets in that it combines
a wide array of transactions and customized products without any unifying
characteristics or regulatory structure." As such, depending on the product
and on how the transaction is settled, multiple types and levels of regulation
may apply to OTC derivatives.
5 6
The first regulatory exemption for energy derivatives trading, the
CFTC's Energy Order, exempts individually-negotiated derivative
transactions between commercial participants in the energy sector that
involves crude oil, natural gas liquids and their derivative products.57
Energy derivatives contracts between "eligible participants" (institutional
investors, financial institutions, governmental entities, professional traders,
and businesses or individuals with more than $10 million in assets) are
generally exempt from regulation under the CEA 8  Presumably, public
consumers differ from sophisticated parties in that public consumers require
investor-protection regulation provided by futures exchanges.
59
Nonetheless, the CFTC does retain limited jurisdiction over the OTC
markets to enforce the CEA anti-fraud and anti-price manipulation
provisions. Furthermore, the CFTC can mandate disclosure of some
transaction information (such as price, volume, and delivery intention) from
53 See Energy White Paper, supra note 5; Karol, supra note 11, at 204-05.
54 See, e.g., Peter C. Fusaro, The Human Element In Energy Trading, ELEC.
PERSPECTIVES, Nov.-Dec. 2002, available at http://www.eei.org/magazine/editorial-
content/nonavstories/2002-11-01-trade.htm ("Many exchanges have begun offering OTC
clearing services in an attempt to calm traders' fears, with NYMEX and ICE leading the way
in adapting their business models.").
55 See Energy Information Administration, Derivatives and Risk Management in Energy
Industries (Oct. 2002), http://www.eia.doe.gov.
56 Id.; see also PWG Report, supra note 16, at 168 (noting that further complexity results
from the significant use of over-the-counter derivatives by entities that are also subject to
one or more regulatory regimes, either as intermediaries (e.g., investment banks) or as end
users (e.g. pension funds and investment companies)). In addition, there are OTC
transactions within the jurisdiction of the CFTC or SEC that are regulated differently than
exchange-traded products. Derivatives and Risk Management in Energy Industries, supra
note 55, at 49.
57 This exemption applies to transactions between principals and subject to individual
negotiation that have no unilateral right of offset. See Energy Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 21286-02
(Apr. 20, 1993).
58 CRS Report, supra note 21, at 2.
59 id.
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those OTC traders who use certain electronic trading systems.60
This decision by the CFTC not to regulate the new OTC energy
derivatives markets was an affirmative choice by the regulators and has
been reaffirmed in subsequent legislation.6' Consequently, for OTC
derivatives exempt or excluded from CFTC regulation, the application of a
regulatory scheme typically is based on the party that is offering or entering
into the contract being a registered entity. 62 Since the contract or
transaction is not regulated, the trading of OTC energy derivatives is
referred to as unregulated energy trading.
The Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) is the most prominent example of
such an electronic trading system. ICE operates its OTC electronic
platform as an exempt commercial market under the CEA and regulations
of the CFTC. The CFTC generally oversees, but does not substantively
regulate, the trading of OTC derivative contracts on the ICE platform. As
an exempt commercial market, ICE is required to comply with the access,
reporting, and record-keeping requirements of the CFTC, but ICE's OTC
business is not otherwise subject to substantive regulation by the CFTC or
other U.S. regulatory authorities. 64 In addition, ICE is required to report to
the CFTC certain information regarding transactions in products that are
subject to the CFTC's jurisdiction and that meet certain specified trading
volume levels, as well as to record and report to the CFTC complaints of
alleged fraud or manipulative trading activity related to certain ICE
products that the company receives.65
C. CFTC Oversight of Futures Markets and Enforcement Procedures
Futures markets play a critically important role in the U.S. economy.
They provide risk management tools that producers, distributors, and
60 See, e.g., id.
61 See, e.g., PWG Report, supra note 16; Chirstopher Faille, Why the Case For a Free
Market in Energy Derivatives Has Survived Enron, 50 Fed. Law. 39, 43 (2003). The
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 will be discussed infra pp. 13-15.
Moreover, CFTC Commissioners have repeatedly stated in public statements that the CTFC
will not regulate OTC trading like it regulates non-exempt derivatives trading.
62 Energy Industry Derivatives Report, supra note 10 ("OTC derivatives may fall into one
of four general regulatory jurisdictions-CFTC, SEC, a banking regulator, or an insurance
regulator-or none at all.").
63 See id.; see also, cf Neves, supra note 10; Special Report: FT Comment After Enron:
A Fresh Look at Rules for Energy and Finance, Trading and Bank Supervision, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2002 [hereinafter FT Report], available at 2002 WLNR 6710945 (discussing
Enron's specialization in "unregulated energy trading").
64 See Intercontinental Exchange, ICE: The Energy Marketplace,
https://www.theice.com/profile.jhtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). Both the CFTC and




commercial users of commodities use to manage price risk.66 The futures
markets also play a price discovery role, as participants in related cash and
OTC markets look to futures markets to discover prices that accurately
reflect information on supply, demand, and other factors. Since 2000, the
CFTC has exercised regulatory authority over commodity futures contracts
and options, including futures and options on "exempted" securities, such
as Treasury bills traded on CFTC-approved exchanges and in the OTC
market.67 The CFTC is also responsible for regulating all exchanges that
trade commodities for future delivery, approving all futures and options
contracts traded on these exchanges, registering traders who buy or sell
commodities for others, and monitoring exchange information such as
volume and open interest. While the CFTC does not have regulatory
authority over exempted derivatives and transactions conducted over-the-
counter between specified entities, the Commission investigates energy
trading that impacts the futures markets under its anti-fraud and
manipulation authority.68
To illustrate the CFTC's role in overseeing exchange rules and
enforcing the CEA's anti-fraud and market manipulation rules, this section
will briefly describe the CFTC's current market oversight and enforcement
procedures for exchange-based energy futures trading. The CFTC operates
a comprehensive system of collecting information on market participants.
The Commission collects market data and position information from
exchanges, clearing members, futures commission merchants, foreign
brokers, and traders. 69  The Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS)
requires traders to file daily reports and is the cornerstone of the CFTC's
market surveillance program. Under LTRS, clearing members, FCMs, and
66 For instance, the Chicago Board of Trade trades derivatives that guarantee the future
delivery of corn. Anyone needing a few thousand bushels in the months to come can lock in
the price today. CFTC Brochure, supra note 20.
67 Energy Info. Agency, Energy Trading Regulation (2002), http://www.eia.doe.gov. The
CFTC had approved rules consisting of four separate releases on November 22, 2000, that
contained many provisions similar to the provisions of the CFMA. However, in a release
issued on December 21, 2000, and effective as of December 28, 2000, the CFTC withdrew
almost all the new rules as a result of the enactment of the Act. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, http://www.cftc.gov (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
68 Id.; cf Michael Schroeder, Futures Traders Resist Tighter Oversight Plan - Bill Would
Give Commodity Commission Greater Regulatory Powers Over Some Gas Markets, THE
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2006, at A6 (discussing recent debates over the scope and extent of the
CFTC's authority to investigate and regulate trading activities in over-the-counter markets,
and quoting a CFTC director, who notes that the over-the-counter and futures markets are
interdependent and thus, investigations into the futures markets have involved over-the-
counter transactions as well).
69 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Backgrounder: The CFTC's Large-Trader
Reporting System, http://www.cftc.gov/opa/ backgrounder/opa-ltrs.htm (last visited May 18,
2007). This system operates under rules set out in Parts 15-19 and Part 21 of the
Regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act. Id.
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foreign brokers (reporting firms) file daily reports which show the futures
and option positions of traders that hold positions at or above specific
reporting levels set by the CFTC. 70 The CFTC may review the terms and
conditions of a contract to determine whether it is not readily susceptible to
manipulation. Once listed, CFTC staff closely monitors, on a real-time
basis, trading on the exchanges to detect unusual activity or price
aberrations that may indicate actual or attempted manipulation. Through
this system, the CFTC becomes aware of concentrated and coordinated
positions that might be used by one or more traders to attempt market
manipulations. In addition, each futures exchange is required under the
CEA to supervise trading, prices, and positions and must impose trade
position limits, where appropriate, to guard against manipulation; reporting
firms are subject to on-site audits by exchange and Commission staff.1
Upon identifying a potential threat, the CFTC consults and coordinates
its activities with the regulatory staff of the exchange(s). The Commission
may require a firm to file additional trading reports and may make a
"special call" on a firm to provide more information about its trading.72 On
a special call CFTC staff may contact, for example, the largest long- and
short-side traders, to obtain information on their delivery intentions and
capability and their price objectives in liquidating trades, to advise them of
the CFTC's concern regarding the orderly expiration of the futures contract.
This procedure is usually effective in resolving most potential disputes. On
four historic occasions, the CFTC exercised its emergency powers to limit,
liquidate, or halt trading. 3
III. THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE DURING ENRON'S ASCENT
OTC markets have expanded the types of derivatives contracts
70 From time to time, the Commission may raise or lower these reporting thresholds in
specific markets, "to strike a balance between collecting sufficient information to oversee the
markets and minimizing the reporting burden on the futures industry and the public." Id.
71 In addition to the CFTC's oversight programs, designated contract markets, derivatives
transaction execution facilities, and designated clearing organizations also have self-
regulatory responsibilities. Designated contract markets must meet eighteen core principles
on an ongoing basis, derivatives transaction execution facilities must comply with nine core
principles, and DCOs must comply with fourteen core principles. Id.
72 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, The CFTC's Large-Trader Reporting System,
supra note 69. The Commission has assigned confidential reporting numbers to reporting
firms and traders to ensure the privacy of the information they provide. Except under limited
circumstances, the Commission is prohibited (under § 8 of the CEA) from publicly
disclosing any person's positions, transactions, or trade secrets.
73 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Oversight and Market Integrity (2005),
http://www.cftc.gov; see also Reuben Jeffery III, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, Address to the American Bar Association Committee on Futures and
Derivatives Instruments (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.cftc.gov; New York Mercantile
Exchange Energy Complex (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.nymex.com.
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available to energy market participants beyond simple futures contracts and
include many new types of derivatives unregulated by the CFTC.74
Throughout the 1990s, as derivatives developed increasingly innovative and
complex contract structures, market participants faced uncertainty about the
legal status of OTC derivatives trading and unregulated energy derivatives.
By the late 1990s, this legal uncertainty hindered further development of
derivatives trading in energy markets. Calls for legal clarity and market
events prompted Congressional efforts to clarify the CFTC's jurisdiction
and overhaul the existing regulation scheme for OTC derivatives.
75
Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
("CFMA"), the most significant "pre-Enron" energy trading legislation, to
overhaul the provisions of the CEA.76 The most significant "post-Enron"
energy-trading legislation-the CFTC Reauthorization-will be discussed
in the context of current issues in the energy trading industry.
A. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000
The CFMA emerged to resolve uncertainty concerning the legal status
and enforceability of OTC derivatives transactions.77 Many industry
participants feared that without clarification of the CFTC's jurisdiction, a
court ruling that OTC derivatives were "futures contracts" could derail the
burgeoning market.78 With passage of the Act, Congress sought to confirm
the CFTC's jurisdiction over futures contracts.79 Congress relied heavily on
a "policy roadmap" provided by the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets ("PWG") in its November 1999 report "Over-the-
74 See Jerry W. Markham, The Birth of the Unregulated Derivatives, in COMMODITIES
REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS, 13A COMMODITIES REG. § 27:31
(Clark Boardman Callahan 2005) (discussing the development of hybrid and exotic
derivatives and other derivatives instruments that were not "contracts for sale of a
commodity for future delivery" under the CEA).
75 In late 1998, the near-collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management
prompted the then-chairwoman of the CFTC to suggest that the agency should consider
some regulation of derivatives contracts. Schroeder, supra note 68.
76 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2001). The Act was passed as part of H.R. 4577, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, in
2001.
77 S. 2697-The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000: Joint Hearing on S.
2697 Before the S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 9 (2000) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/ testimony/2000/2000062 1. htm.
78 Walt Lukken, Reauthorization: Let the Debate Begin, 24 No. 6 FUTURES &
DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2004) (noting that over-the-counter derivatives trading is now a
multi-trillion dollar market).
79 See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, About the CFTC,
http://www.cflc.gov/anr/anrabout00.htm (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter About the CFTC].
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Counter Derivatives and the Commodity Exchange Act" which clarified the
CFTC's jurisdiction in the OTC market .8  In determining the CFTC's
authority, the report looked to whether the products were being traded by
retail customers, whether the products were susceptible to price
manipulation, and whether the participants were not otherwise regulated.
Absent these factors in the market, the PWG found no policy justification
for CFTC oversight. Consequently, the report concluded that OTC
derivatives transactions should be subject to the CEA only if necessary to
achieve the public policy objectives of the act-deterring market
manipulation and protecting investors against fraud and other unfair
practices.81
In the case of financial derivatives transactions involving professional
counterparties, the PWG concluded that regulation was unnecessary for
these purposes because financial derivatives generally are not readily
susceptible to manipulation and because professional counterparties can
protect themselves against fraud and unfair practices.82 As such, the PWG
recommended that financial OTC derivatives transactions between
professional counterparties be excluded from coverage of the CEA, even if
executed electronically.
83
Finally, to further facilitate the development of efficient and reliable
electronic trading systems, the PWG recommended that transactions
otherwise excluded from the CEA not fall within the ambit of the act simply
because they are cleared.84 The PWG concluded that clearing should be
subject to government oversight but that such oversight need not be
provided by the CFTC. Instead, the PWG suggested that for many types of
derivatives, oversight could be provided by the SEC, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, or a foreign financial
regulator that the appropriate U.S. regulator determines to have satisfied its
standards.85
As enacted, the CFMA incorporated most of the PWG's
recommended provisions, streamlining regulation of futures and derivatives
markets and providing crucial legal certainty for OTC derivatives.
86
Moreover, in recognition of the rapidly changing derivatives market, the
CFMA replaced the CEA's prescriptive rules and regulations with a
"principles-based approach," to provide flexibility for market participants to
80 Id. ("The provisions of [the Senate's CFMA bill] that address OTC derivatives are
generally consistent with the PWG's conclusions and recommendations.").





86 Lukken, supra note 78.
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use best practices to comply with statutory requirements.87 Most relevantly,
the CFMA provided the regulatory infrastructure for energy derivatives
trading markets to flourish. First, it provided legal certainty for OTC
products by exempting all OTC transactions involving energy commodities
derivatives from most regulatory requirements of the CEA. 8 Second, the
CFMA facilitated the innovation of electronic trading systems for OTC
derivatives products by creating a new category of trading facility called the
exempt commercial market and permitting the clearing of OTC
transactions. 89  Together, these changes increased innovation and
competition in trading markets for energy futures and OTC derivatives. 90
The CFMA provided the legal infrastructure for the heyday of the
energy trading business, led by Enron. The booming growth of energy
trading markets that followed in 2000 and 2001 appeared to confirm the
enactment of the CFMA of 2000 as a regulatory success. 91
B. Enron's Role in the Rise of Energy Trading
Active trading of different contracts for the delivery of wholesale
power boomed in the mid-1990s following deregulation and the inflow of
power marketers into the industry.92 Trading began with traders buying and
selling forward contracts over the phone to energy companies looking to
hedge against price volatility and it increased with the development of the
internet.93 Enron quickly became one of the key players in the wholesale
power market, acting mainly as a market maker to which energy was both
bought and sold by the firm to make a profit.94 Many products sold in this
market were conceived by Enron itself and designed to help power
87 id.
88 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(h)(1) (2002). Eligible contract participants are defined in § 1(12) of the
CEA; exempt commodities are defined in § 1(14) of the CEA; transactions not executed on a
trading facility are defined in § 1(33) of the CEA. In transactions in exempt commodities,
the CFTC's anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules are retained.
89 See Reuben Jeffrey, III, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Address to the Int'l Swaps and Derivatives Assoc. (Dec. 6, 2005), transcript available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches05/opajeffery-4.htm.
90 See S. REP. No. 109-119 (2005) (reporting testimony by industry representatives on
the effects of the CFMA on the energy trading markets).
91 Growth and Development of the Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Dr. James
Newsome, Former-Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, President, N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., Inc.) ("The futures industry has experienced tremendous growth since the
adoption of the CFMA in December 2000, a clear sign that the current regulatory regime is
appropriate for these markets at this time.").
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suppliers manage price risks associated with future electricity purchases. 95
By the late 1990s, Enron and other energy traders were hailed as the
high-tech future of the power industry. 96  Among the energy trading
companies and in the business community, Enron rose to dominance-
becoming the seventh-largest corporation in the United States and the
largest energy trader in the world.97  For six consecutive years, Fortune
magazine ranked Enron as the "most innovative" among the magazines'
"most admired" corporations.98 In 2000 and 2001, Enron's energy trading
business was the driving force behind the company's seemingly
unstoppable, yet indiscernible profits. 99 One description of Enron at this
time was "a huge, unregulated trading company-in effect, an investment
bank that escaped all the normal prudential and conduct of business
rules. ,100
Enron was admired on Wall Street as a technological innovator.'0 '
Much of Enron's trading activity took place on EnronOnline, an Internet-
based marketplace for buyers and sellers launched in 1999.102 EnronOnline
quickly became the largest e-business site in the world and the world's most
popular platform for unregulated energy trading, selling nearly 2,100
different products to traders across four continents in fifteen different
currencies and averaging 6,000 transactions per day worth about $2.5
billion. 10 3 However, in October 2001, after Enron admitted to allegations of
overstating profits by more than $580 million since 1997, energy buyers
and sellers lost faith in Enron's creditworthiness and began moving to other
marketplaces. 1
04
95 Enron was, in essence, two companies. One was an energy supply company that
purchased real physical assets such as pipelines and electrical power plants in order to
provide energy. The other was a financial institution that functioned as a major dealer in
wholesale and derivatives transactions in energy products, other commodities, and some
financial derivatives. See Neves, supra note 10, at 92-93.
96 BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (Penguin Books 2003); see also Face Value:
Regaining Energy - Mayo Shattuck and the Revival of Energy Trading, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug. 24, 2004, at 60 [hereinafter Shattuck].
97 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 96.
98 Id.
99 Id. (recounting the secrecy with which Enron discussed its financial statements and
McLean's Fortune magazine article in which she raised questions about the company's
financial statements and reported profits).
1oo FT Report, supra note 63.
101 Id.
102 Francis R. Grabowski, Enron at 3, http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/casestudies/28.doc
(last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
103 Id. at 4.
104 Enron announced huge losses caused by two partnerships on October 16, 2001.
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 96.
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Enron first caught public attention in 2000 not for its trading platform,
but as the leader of a group of companies, many based in Texas, that were
profiting hugely as electricity prices soared in California. 10 5 Enron and its
peers vigorously denied wrongdoing, noting that price increases were none
other than the inevitable result of the state's power shortage. In June 2001,
after the Bush administration imposed interstate power price caps that
California had sought months earlier, the crisis suddenly eased, and prices
in the state plunged. When prices dropped, Enron's profits from California
turned to losses. 10 6  Subsequent investigation implicated Enron's energy
trading business as a fundamental component of the company's fraudulent
accounting and strategy to manipulate California energy prices in the
summer of 2001.107
The functioning of the California energy market created a medium in
which price manipulation, and Enron, could flourish. 10 8 Enron was not the
only energy company involved in plans to manipulate energy prices in
California, 09 and it maintained that most, if not all, of its trading strategies
were permitted under California's deregulation laws. The goal in California
had been a competitive market for the buying and selling of power, but that
was not the result. The compromise-deregulation at the wholesale level,
but price caps at the retail level-would begin with a utility restructuring
law taking effect in 1998.110 Wholesale power prices in California were
deregulated, yet power distribution companies were capped as to power
costs that could be recovered from ratepayers. 111 Enron also gained from a
severe drought in the Pacific Northwest, which contributed to power
shortages and capped retail prices that provided little if any incentive for
consumers to conserve energy.1 12 Finally, there was little if any incentive to
invest in generation assets, which meant there was not enough generation
capacity in the state to meet peak day power demands. 1' 1  Given the
105 Neves, supra note 10.
106 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 96.
107 Internal company memoranda and communications about Enron's practices during the
crisis in 2000 and 2001 revealed several schemes designed to exploit Enron's trading
position in wholesale energy markets and sustain high prices. See id.
108 Neves, supra note 10, at 101-03.
109 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 96 (noting that at least one generator settled a
claim that it withheld power from the California market for the purpose of driving up power
prices and making additional profits on its power).
110 AMY ABEL, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING BRIEFING BOOK: CALIFORNIA,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (May 25, 2001), http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/
briefingbooks/electricity/caoverview.cfm.
111 Id.
112 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, The Western Energy Crisis, The Enron Bankruptcy
and FERC's Response, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/chron/
chronology.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
11 Neves, supra note 10, at 101-03. See also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, The
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:665 (2007)
foregoing, skyrocketing prices and the financial failure of two of the state's
largest public utilities, the shortages in the summer of 2001 should not have
been unforeseen.' 
14
IV. THE IMPACT OF ENRON'S COLLAPSE ON ENERGY MARKET
REGULATION
In January 2002, one month after Enron filed bankruptcy, the U.S.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resource held a hearing
soliciting testimony from industry experts and regulators on the impact of
Enron's collapse.1 5 The hearing reflected the debates that had dominated
the U.S. energy markets since then. Ironically, the then-Chairman of FERC
testified at that hearing that "the collapse itself has had little perceptible
impact on the commodity wholesale electric and gas markets in the
country," which are the primary responsibility of the FERC. 116 Moreover,
the Chairman testified that:
[FERC's] monitoring of the energy markets to date has indicated
there's been no immediate damage to the energy trading in both gas
and electric [sic], or certainly of the underlying physical energy
supplies. These energy markets adjusted quite quickly to Enron's
collapse, particularly when you consider that Enron was-counted
for 15 to 20 percent of the trades in these aggregated markets. As
can be expected, there has been some volatility in these markets with
the swift exit of them from trading that has impacted liquidity in the
markets, and so the ranges that have traded.
17
However, the message of that testimony-that the collapse itself was
not to blame for the industry's subsequent problems-was quickly lost as
the energy markets declined amidst the subsequent market changes and
investigations that contradicted the quick adjustment provided by FERC in
January 2002.118
Western Energy Crisis, The Enron Bankruptcy and FERC's Response,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/chron/chronology.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007).
114 Neves, supra note 10, at 101-03.
115 Enron Corporation's Collapse, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resource, 107th Cong. (2002).
116 Enron Corporation's Collapse, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resource, 107th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of Pat Wood, III, Chairman, Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n).
117 Id.
118 See, cf, Energy White Paper, supra note 5; Anne Feltus, Tough Times For Energy
Traders, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2003, 11, 11 ("The fall of Enron has left a trail of




Enron's collapse prompted several setbacks to the U.S. gas and power
trading business. '19 Immediately following the bankruptcy announcement,
investors grew anxious that Enron might disappear and quickly sold shares,
causing tens of billions of dollars in shareholder value to evaporate.
120
Credit downgrades, falling stock prices, and governmental investigations
followed, forcing firms to scale back their trading units or exit the business
altogether as $90 billion in industry debt was reduced to "junk" status.121
By the summer of 2002, the industry "had gone from bad to awful" as
regulators, bad publicity, and fleeing investors overwhelmed the "suddenly-
sinful" industry.1 22  Virtually all of the major energy traders, including
veteran energy companies Dynegy, American Electric Power, and Reliant,
"capitulated"-selling off or closing energy trading operations. 123
Allegations of fraudulent and illegal trading activity, market manipulation,
and other claims levied against Enron and energy traders at over fifty
companies, triggered investigations by Congress, the CFTC and FERC.
24
Contrary to initial claims, throughout the energy trading business few
companies with gas and power trading operations were spared reputational
harm and economic loss, contributing to a loss of confidence in the entire
energy trading business. 
125
Enron's collapse brought an increase in agency investigations and
"9 See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 96 (noting the "flurry" of political uproar
and market disasters that followed the Enron bankruptcy and the California Energy Crisis);
Energy White Paper, supra note 5.
120 For example, California's Public Employees' Retirement System, the largest public
pension fund in the country, held roughly 2.8 million Enron shares worth $197 million in
2000. A month after the bankruptcy, on November 29, 2001, the shares were only worth
about $1.2 million. Winners and Losers in Enron's Demise, Fox News (Nov. 29, 2001)
[hereinafter Fox News], available at http://www.foxnews.com.
121 Two rating agencies dropped Enron's credit rating to "junk" status on November 28,
2001. Id.; see also, e.g. Shattuck, supra note 96 ("Several traders, including Dynergy,
Mirant, Calpine and Williams, saw their debt ratings downgraded from investment grade to
junk status, making it tougher for them to obtain credit to sustain their operations.").
122 Fox News, supra note 120 (noting that energy companies busied themselves
"convincing the world they want nothing to do with the suddenly-sinful business."). The
industry's financial and structural woes were compounded by increased attention given to
Enron and other companies' financial reporting and accounting, after several high-profile
accounting scandals spurred an unprecedented crackdown on corporate crime by prosecutors
and regulators. Indeed, in the months immediately following Enron's bankruptcy,
authorities focused their attention on the off-balance-sheet partnerships and accounting
techniques that Enron used to inflate its profits.
123 Id. (quoting Mayo Shattuck, president of Constellation Energy Company). These
companies had "spent the 1990s reinventing themselves as whizzy energy traders," only to
then retreat from and disavow the business.
124 See, e.g., Energy White Paper, supra note 5.
125 See, e.g., Edward Iwata, Enron's Legacy: Scandal Marked Turning Point, USA
TODAY, Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com.
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enforcement actions, as well as political and legislative response. Perhaps
the most significant regulatory issue currently facing the energy trading
industry is the CFTC Reauthorization. Discussion of the Reauthorization
centers on the natural gas market. The following sections describe these
developments.
A. Agency Investigations and Enforcement Action
Both the CFTC and FERC conducted investigations in response to
allegations that Enron engaged in fraudulent and illegal trading and that it
may have leveraged its market position to distort electric and natural gas
markets in California and other western states. For the sake of brevity, only
the first of FERC's several energy-market investigations, which resulted in
numerous enforcement actions, will be mentioned. In January 2002, FERC
initiated a fact-finding investigation in coordination with the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), the SEC, the CFTC, and the Department of Labor to
determine "whether any entity . . . had manipulated electric energy or
natural gas prices in the West since January 1, 2000.''126 FERC staff
released an initial report seven months later, on August 13, 2002, followed
by formal enforcement proceedings against three corporate affiliates of
Enron and two investor-owned utilities that conducted business with
Enron. 127  In March 2003, FERC issued its Final Report on Price
Manipulation in Western Markets, and moved to strip Enron of its market-
based rate authority as a result of conclusions that Enron, as well as other
companies, had purposefully, improperly influenced energy prices in
Western markets through manipulative and illegal trading practices. 128 In
addition, the CFTC conducted numerous inquiries of its own into energy
trading activities and transactions. Nearly $300 million in fines have
resulted from the CFTC's investigation of about fifty-five companies-with
126 The investigation was formally announced on February 13, 2002. Asleep at the
Switch: FERC's Oversight of Enron Corporation, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Gov.
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter FERC Testimony, 2002] (statement of Pat Wood,
III, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/1 11202Wood.htm.
127 FERC initiated proceeding under section 206 of the FPA regarding possible
misconduct by Enron affiliates Enron Power Marketing, Inc., Enron Capital and Trade
Resources Corporation, and investor-owned utilities Portland General Avista Corporation
and El Paso Electric Company. Id.
128 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm. (FERC), Addressing the 2000-2001 Western Energy
Crisis, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2007);
see FERC, Staff Report: Price Manipulation in Western Markets (Mar. 26, 2003),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/enron/summary-findings.pdf; see also
California ISO, Analysis of Trading and Scheduling Strategies Described in Enron Memos





twenty-seven companies and twenty-three individuals charged with either
false-data reporting or attempted manipulation of the commodities
markets.
1 29
Notably, the extensive investigations into all sectors of the energy
industry following Enron's collapse led to increased cooperation among
federal regulators and departments in surveillance, investigation and
enforcement activities. In October 2005, the CFTC and FERC entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding coordinating their oversight activities in
energy markets.1 30 The CFTC's Division of Enforcement investigates and
prosecutes individuals and entities for violations of the CEA, including
manipulation, false reporting, and trade practice abuses. 31 These
investigations may be conducted in cooperation with the applicable
exchanges and other regulators such as FERC. 3 2 Also, the Commissions
can refer criminal matters involving energy markets to the DOJ for their
further investigation (the CFTC has already done so).133 This agreement
signifies a new approach to oversight of energy markets.
B. Political Response and Legislation
Enron's collapse provided an impetus for critics of the current
regulatory system to lobby for increased regulation across the energy
trading industry. Almost immediately, the CFMA's exemption of energy
derivatives from regulatory oversight became a contested issue, as
lawmakers questioned whether regulation-of energy trading or of non-
bank traders in general-could have prevented Enron's failure. 34 Critics
attacked the current regulatory scheme and blamed most, if not all, of
Enron's wrongdoings on "huge loopholes" in the CFMA (i.e., the energy
exemptions) that had "improperly catered to the interests of Enron and the
energy industry."'' 35 Represented primarily by consumer interest groups
129 Review of the Futures Market and Gasoline Prices: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On
Agriculture, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of Walter L. Lukken, Comm'r, Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/hearings/109/10930.pdf
("Since December 2002, the CFTC has filed thirty-two enforcement actions charging
twenty-seven companies and twenty-three individuals for misconduct in the energy markets,
resulting in nearly [$300] million ... in penalties .... Currently, there are over one dozen
open investigations involving the energy markets.").
130 This was part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594




134 See, e.g., FT Report, supra note 63.
135 Senator Dianne Feinstein, Statement on the Feinstein Amendment to H.R. 2673, the
FY04 Agriculture Appropriations (Nov. 5, 2003), in 149 Cong Reg. S13961-75 (daily ed.
Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Speeches/derivatives%2011%
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and Democratic members of Congress such as Senator Dianne Feinstein of
California, they claimed that the CFMA's regulatory scheme
accommodated industry interests and fostered anticompetitive behavior and
market manipulation. These critics called for stricter market monitoring,
stiffer penalties for market manipulation, limitations on certain types of
energy trading, and significant disclosure requirements for contracting
parties.
Proponents of increased regulation especially focused on the OTC
trading market, which they characterized as a secretive vehicle for traders to
manipulate energy markets and defraud regulators and consumers.1 36 In
spite of studies by the PWG and other experts, 37 which concluded the OTC
derivatives markets should not be subject to additional regulation,
lawmakers and activist political groups supported direct regulation by the
CFTC of OTC trading as an urgent necessity to protect consumers and
market integrity. This response differed sharply with a depiction of the
OTC market found in a federal agency report to Congress in May 2000,
which stated, "OTC derivatives have generally been viewed by the federal
financial regulators as presenting limited regulatory concerns ... because
they are considered to be less susceptible to price manipulation.. . [and
present] limited consumer protection concerns because participation is
limited to eligible participants acting for their own accounts."'
' 38
As a result of Enron's abuses, many common trading transactions and
strategies were unfairly shrouded in illegitimacy and suspicion. 39  For
example, one strategy Enron used to deliberately manipulate energy prices
in California was a trading practice referred to as "round-tripping" in which
energy is sold out of an area in the day-ahead markets to be bought back in
that area in the real-time market. 40  Critics, notably Senator Feinstein,
characterized such trades as "scam trades," and proposed a blanket
prohibition on the practice. 41 However, so long as the trade is done within
205.pdf [hereinafter Feinstein Statement].
136 See id.
137 See PWG Report, supra note 16; see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC
TRADING SYSTEMS (2000) [hereinafter GAO Report to Congress on Electronic Trading
Regulation].
138 GAO Report to Congress on Electronic Trading Regulation, supra note 137, at 10.
139 See Neves, supra note 10 at 102-03; cf Feltus, supra note 118 ("[Enron]'s successes,
it turned out, were based in part on smoke-and-mirrors accounting techniques and bogus
trades-common practices in the energy trading sector.").
140 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 96; see also Neves, supra note 10, at 103 (noting
that the practice is more commonly known as "parking and lending" or "banking" power).
141 Feinstein Statement, supra note 135 (noting the bill's "specific prohibition of the
round-trip trading manipulation used so effectively to inflate electricity prices to the public's
injury," and the "need for explicit prohibitions on harmful and fraudulent market behavior"
demonstrated by "the success of the company's trading strategies"). According to Sen.
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the FERC open access transmission rules, the practice is a legitimate
"calendar spread" trade that is actually liquidity enhancing.142
C. The "Feinstein Amendment"
Senator Dianne Feinstein's energy trading bill, the Energy Policy Act
of 2003, was at the forefront of post-Enron attacks on the CFMA and
efforts to increase regulation of energy trading. Within months of Enron's
bankruptcy announcement, Senator Feinstein began to push an energy
derivatives amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2003 (the Feinstein
Amendment).143 The bill proposed to increase regulation of OTC trading
and impose new disclosure requirements for parties to electricity and
natural gas derivatives contracts.
While Enron's collapse was the most-cited argument for the Feinstein
Amendment, other issues motivated bill supporters. Senator Feinstein had
raised similar concerns and regulatory proposals prior to Enron's collapse,
during California's energy crisis in late 2000 and 2001. Additionally, one
of Senator Feinstein's most important allies, the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX), supported the bill as a means of addressing the threat
posed by its competitors in the OTC markets. Specifically, NYMEX
supported imposing CFTC-style regulations on electronic trading platforms
such as the Intercontinental Exchange ("ICE") and Trade Spark. 45 These
electronic trading platforms had quickly filled the void left by EnronOnline
Feinstein, "All of the Enron's trading strategies ... [were] euphemisms for fraud and
manipulation and [her] amendment would cover them all." Id. at 4.
142 Neves, supra note 10, at 103 (emphasis in original).
,43 Senator Feinstein has proposed an energy derivative bill, referred to as the "Feinstein
Amendment," on more than one occasion. The Feinstein Amendment was initially proposed
in February 2002 as an amendment to S. 517, the initial version of what was eventually
enacted as the Energy Policy Act of 2003. The bill was proposed again in the following term
in 2003, as an amendment to S. 509, the version of the Energy Policy Act then making its
way through the Senate. The Feinstein Amendment required FERC to promulgate
regulations establishing an electronic information system to facilitate price transparency and
participation in markets subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission; prohibited any person
or entity from knowingly entering into any contract or other arrangement to execute a round-
trip trade; increased criminal and civil penalties for violations of the Federal Power Act and
general penalties of the Natural Gas Act; prohibited manipulation in the wholesale electricity
markets and gave FERC discretionary authority to revoke market-based rates for violations;
repealed the "Enron" exemption for large traders in energy derivatives and applied the anti-
manipulation and anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act to all Over-the-
Counter trades in energy derivatives; and provided an exception for financial derivatives and
metals. Text of the Feinstein Amendment is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/C?r108:./temp/-rlO8S8iOiQ (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
144 See Feinstein Statement, supra note 135.
145 These trading platforms qualified as electronic commercial markets under the CFMA.
See S. REP. No. 109-119, at 3 (2005) (testimony of ICE President on how the CFMA helped
his company).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:665 (2007)
and continued to flourish as market conditions and innovative products
attracted new market participants and revived trading activity among energy
companies. 146
Nevertheless, if not for the furor and suspicions raised by Enron and
the California energy crisis, Feinstein's proposal would have seemed
unlikely, if not illogical, when it was first introduced. 147 Less than two
years earlier, after extensive research, reports, and debate, Congress had
passed the CFMA-exempting most energy derivatives and OTC trading
from CFTC rules. 148 In the aftermath of Enron's collapse, however, the
political climate changed significantly and Senator Feinstein's bill
generated media attention and a surprising degree of initial support. 1
49
In response to Feinstein's proposed legislation, industry participants,
including financial firms, banks, energy companies, and industry
organizations, quickly opposed Senator Feinstein's efforts to increase
industry regulation and oversight, particularly in the OTC trading
markets. 50 They viewed the proposed regulatory changes as a threat to
companies' ability to "rely on OTC derivatives to manage efficiently the
financial market risks inherent in their core economic activities."''5 Joined
by the Department of the Treasury, the SEC, the CFTC, and the Federal
Reserve Board, the industry repeatedly lobbied Congressional leaders to
reject Senator Feinstein's proposals. 152  Industry leaders warned that
146 John Herron, Online Trading and Clearing After Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK:
THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR
CORPORATIONS 130, 130-44 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003).
147 Id.
148 Will Acworth, Traders Up In Arms Over Feinstein Bill, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 11,
2002, at 3, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?id=020411001818 ("The debate in the
US Senate over the so-called Feinstein amendment might seem like a sideshow in the great
drama of Enron's rise and fall [when it was proposed in 2002]....
149 See id.
150 Letter from the ISDA to the Honorable Bill Frist, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and
the Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate Democratic Leader (May 7, 2003) [hereinafter
ISDA Letter 1], available at http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/FeinsteinLetter050703.pdf
("We urge you to oppose any financial derivatives, energy derivatives, metals derivatives
and energy trading market provisions contained in S. 509 that may be offered as
amendments by Senator Feinstein to H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2003."); see also,
Acworth, supra note 148.
151 See ISDA Letter 1, supra note 150; ISDA, About ISDA,
http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa.nav.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
152 See Letter from the ISDA, to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate Majority
Leader, and the Honorable Trent Lott, U.S. Senate Republican Leader (Apr. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.isda.org/c.and-a/pdf/FeinsteinLetter-Senate-April08.pdf
[hereinafter ISDA Letter 2] (sent on behalf of fifty-three different organizations, including
energy companies, commercial and investment banks, financial firms, industry associations,
and non-profit organizations). The Letter included a memorandum from the ISDA,




enactment of the Amendment would be premature and imprudent given the
lack of opportunity for full review of the proposed regulations. 1 53  The
relevant committees of jurisdiction had not yet reviewed the Amendment's
implications for energy and other derivatives activity.1
54
Specifically, industry experts argued that the implications of the
Feinstein Amendment posed several far-reaching implications that would
undermine the legal certainty provided by the CFMA and would be counter-
productive to the development of stable, efficient energy markets.
155
Moreover, the overly-broad Amendment would be detrimental to market
participants, engender significant jurisdictional uncertainty between the
CFTC and FERC, and unnecessarily affect transactions and parties outside
the scope of the CEA and unrelated to Enron's alleged malfeasance.1
56
Then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, and then-
Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neil, supported these statements and
strongly advised against re-opening the complex regulatory overhaul
accomplished in the CFMA.157 In contrast to Feinstein's proposal, which
would have created market-undermining uncertainty, Greenspan supported
a hands-off approach to allow the market to absorb the Enron shockwaves
and respond with innovation.
58
The Feinstein Amendment was not enacted in the Energy Policy Act of
2003 as Feinstein had initially hoped. The bill was voted down 56-41 in the
Senate on November, 5, 2003,151 and industry groups that had lobbied
against the bill publicly applauded the Senate's decision to uphold the
http://www.isda.org/c-anda/pdf/FeinsteinAmendment-Legal-Analysis-March.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum from the ISDA].
153 ISDA Letter 2, supra note 152.
S154id.
155 Memorandum from the ISDA, supra note 152.
156 id.
157 Acworth, supra note 148.
158 See Herron, supra note 146 (noting that the post-Enron online trading markets are
more efficient and solid, and that the innovations of bilateral credit risk management and
centralized clearing and settlement have enabled online trading to gain ground). While this
paper will not specifically discuss developments in online trading platforms, it is significant
to note that Herron concludes, "The facility to transact energy trades has not been damaged,
and, although there may be some market distortions due to a small loss in price transparency,
market efficiency has moved quickly to fill any void." Id. at 144 (emphasis added). See also
Alan Greenspan, Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan Finance: United States and Global
At the Institute of International Finance, New York, New York (via videoconference), Apr.
22, 2002, available at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2002/0423/epf212.htm (noting
that broad deregulation over the past twenty-five years and innovation in financial markets
are major factors contributing to the growing resilience of the U.S. economy).
159 See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes for Senate Amendment 2083 to H.R. 2673, available
at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfm.cfm?congress
=
108&session=l&vote=00436 (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
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existing legal framework.160 Since then, Senator Feinstein has continued to
promote regulations to improve operation of energy' markets by introducing
substantially similar legislation on three occasions.
D. Market Responses-Change and Resurgence in the Energy Trading
Industry
The energy trading market has changed significantly since 2002 due to
the emergence of new market participants and increased price volatility.
62
What remained of Enron's and other energy companies' trading operations
was quietly acquired by a handful of banks and financial institutions.
63
These new players added much-needed market liquidity, but struggled to
fill the void left by Enron and other big marketers, such as Aquila and
Dynergy, Inc.'64
The lack of marketers and reliable counterparties affected the natural
gas trading markets, leaving large price disparities between cash and futures
markets among regions. 65 Enron and other big marketers had negotiated
with an array of parties, from producers to end-users, and were well-placed
to take either side of a trade 6. After their departure, the market lacked
reliable counterparties, particularly coast-to-coast marketers. The
investment banks that moved into the trading business stepped in on the
financial side, offering swaps and options, but were hesitant to get involved
in physical delivery transactions or contracts longer than two or three years,
a useful tool for manufacturers or power generators looking to hedge long-
term fuel costs. 167 According to one futures broker-dealer, the situation as
"not only a question of thinning out the number of traders, but the kind of
traders that are left."'161 With fewer traders and a significant decline in gas
160 See Press Release, ISDA, ISDA Applauds Senate Decision on Energy Market
Amendment (Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://www.isda.org/press/press 1 10503.html.
161 This will be discussed further in the next section, in the context of the CFTC
reauthorization.
162 See, e.g., Ann Davis, The Energy Trading High Wire - Big Profits Lure Rich
Investors, But Wild Rides Rattle Them, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2006, at Cl; Alexei
Barrionuevo, Energy Trading, Without a Certain "E', N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at Cl.
163 Investment bank UBS Warburg acquired most of Enron's energy trading operations in
February 2002. Barrionnuevo, supra note 162.
164 Joseph Silha, US Natural Gas Trade Still Struggling After Enron, REUTERS NEWS,
Feb. 24, 2004.
165 Id.
166 See Neves, supra note 10.
167 Silha, supra note 164 (noting the "obvious" gap in prices and marketing "on the
physical side" of natural gas trading markets despite expanded efforts by BP and
ChevronTexaco Corp.).




futures trading volume, 169 liquidity dropped off at many points in smaller
markets and in areas away from the major natural gas delivery points. 
70
More recently, over the last eighteen months, natural gas markets have
seen some of the highest prices and largest price swings in decades. During
2006, users complained that shortages of natural gas had created a market
dominated by speculators who manipulate prices, and calls to investigate
trading practices resurfaced.' 7' Some experts attributed price swings to
market changes, such as the new types of traders or less efficient pricing
due to fewer buyers and sellers and wider bids. 7 2 Other industry experts
pointed to factors such as decline in the value of the dollar 73 and changes in
consumption, rather than a lack of efficiency in trading transactions. 74 At
any rate, while unpredictable factors like weather, natural disasters, and
geopolitical unrest always have driven the cost of energy, natural gas prices
are "especially tricky" and sensitive to weather. 
75
Natural gas prices are particularly subject to volatility due to particular
features of the U.S. natural gas market. Natural gas pipelines have limited
capacity and unpredictable factors, such as weather, can affect supply as
well as consumer demand. For example, the hurricanes in 2006
exacerbated already low supply levels, particularly in the areas that depend
upon the Gulf of Mexico for natural gas, and the unusually hot summer and
cold winter drove demand higher than expected, further straining supply.
Natural gas can also be transported in liquefied format ("LNG"), but the
United States competes with other consuming countries in Europe and Asia,
some of which are state-owned and have long-term contracts. Such
169 From 2002 to 2003, NYMEX gas futures trade "dropped more than 20 percent from
2002's record volume to just over 19 million contracts." By February 2004, trading volume
continued to decline and "open interest, the number of long and short contracts outstanding,
[was] down to about 320,000 lots, after peaking at more than 575,000 in April 2002." Id.
170 "The Henry Hub, a key natural gas pipeline interchange in Louisiana, is the standard
delivery point for gas futures." Id.
171 See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 68. The debate over natural gas prices in recent
months is discussed further infra Part V.
172 Silha, supra note 164 (quoting Stephan Smith, head of an energy consulting firm
based in Mississippi).
173 Id. (quoting Joe Terranova, director of trading at MBF Clearing Corp. in New York).
174 See Sharon Brown-Hruska, Comm'r, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
Does the Tail Wag the Dog? The Case of Natural Gas Markets, Speech Before the Natural
Gas Roundtable of Washington University Club (Mar. 28, 2006),
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches06/opabrownhruska-42.htm.
175 Natural gas is a main fuel for plastics, fertilizer production, and electricity
generation--especially in times of high demand-and nearly 60% of U.S. homes use natural
gas for heat. As a result, its price is especially sensitive to weather. NaturalGasFacts.org,
Natural Gas Facts, http://www.naturalgasfacts.org/factsheets/nat__gas-facts.html; American
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customers are often unwilling to sell gas on the spot market even at very
high prices. 176  Thus, supply and demand (and price) of natural gas is
uncertain and difficult to predict, making derivatives even more essential to
managing risk.
The recent surge in price volatility may have helped to stabilize, or at
least revive, not only the natural gas trading markets, but also energy
trading in general.' 7  Volatility is the feature that both creates risk in
energy trading and also makes it so alluring-a correct bet can return
"blockbuster" profits, in a short span of time.1 78  As such, the volatile
energy markets and record-high commodity prices have prompted renewed
interest from investors eager to play in the sector, 179 and prices of energy
futures "are bouncing around like never before," multiplying investment
opportunities and risks as volatility in other markets has fallen.1
80
Capitalizing on the recent market opportunities has allowed investment
banks Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Morgan Stanley to earn billions of
dollars in energy trading in the last two years. 18 1 In the spring of 2006,
Credit Suisse Group and Lehman Brother Holdings Inc., joined by
numerous energy-focused hedge funds, followed into the market, rehiring
traders away from power utilities and oil-trading firms. 182 In sharp contrast
176 FERC, High Natural Gas Prices: The Basics 4 (Dec. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/high-gas-prices- 1 .pdf.
177 See Davis, supra note 162 (noting that in recent months, "[s]ky-high prices have made
energy trading look like easy money," drawing investment banks and hedge funds back into
the business, "reinvigorating some markets that dried up in 2002 after energy-trading
behemoth Enron Corp. collapsed."); see also Barrionuevo, supra note 162 (stating that "[t]he
industry that made Enron infamous--energy trading-is springing to life again.").
178 Davis, supra note 162 (noting, as examples, Amaranth LLC, a $7 billion hedge fund
that "made several-hundred million dollars from trading natural-gas futures" last year,
contributing to the fund's approximately 18% return" and Centaurus Energy LP, a $1 billion
fund founded by a former Enron trader that "turned a nail-biting December into a
blockbuster with a correct bet on natural gas's downhill slide," to put the fund up 160% for
2005).
179 Alexei Barrioneuvo, supra note 162.
180 Davis, supra note 162. In 2005 "[n]atural gas [prices] roughly doubled from [their]
summer peak after Hurricane Katrina to $14.33 per million [BTUs] on October 25, then fell
before peaking Dec[ember] 13 at $15.38." Id. Since then, however, the price has continued
to fall, hovering near $6.50 before a slight rebound to around $6.835 in March, and another
fall to $5.80 in June. See Energy Information Administration, National Average Natural Gas
Prices (2001-2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural-gas/data-publications/
natural-gas.monthlyihistorical/2007/2007_02/pdf/table_04.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
The price plummeted to $5.03 in October, 2006 before finishing the year at $6.65 in
December, 2006. Id.
181 Davis, supra note 162.
182 See Barrionuevo, supra note 162 (noting that in Houston, New York and London,
competition for "top trading talent has ensued that rivals the cutthroat hiring frenzy of the
late 199 0s," and quoting a managing director of a recruiting firm for energy traders as




to a few years ago, investors began "lining up at the door" to invest in
energy trading, in the hope of betting on "the correct side of the
whipsaw."' 83 Thus, it appears that market forces have recently begun to
revitalize the U.S. natural gas trading markets.
V. PRESENT CONCERNS FACING THE ENERGY TRADING
BUSINESS
Industry experts and legal commentators now generally conclude the
legal certainty provisions and flexibility enacted in the CFMA are working
as intended, in spite of the industry turmoil that followed Enron's
collapse.184 Nevertheless, the major issues and concerns that grew out of
the California deregulation debacle and Enron's collapse continue to be
reflected in current policy debates over energy trading and derivative
products. Specifically, vigorous debate surrounds the pending
reauthorization of the CFTC. 85 The CEA requires the CFTC to be
legislatively reauthorized every five years,' 86 to enable Congress to evaluate
whether the CFTC's regulatory structure is accomplishing policy
objectives.181 In practice, various interests recognize the powerful impact
the reauthorization legislation can have on the industry and use the process
to strengthen or weaken the CFTC and lobby for favorable regulatory
changes. 88 Unsurprisingly, in light of the events of 2001 and 2002
recounted above, the new developments and growth in energy derivatives
trading markets following the CFMA, and recent volatility and pricing
concerns in the energy markets, the 2005 reauthorization legislation is
183 Davis, supra note 162.
184 Lukken, supra note 78; Lukken & Overdahl, supra note 18, at § 18:5.4 ("By fixing
the once-shaky legal foundation upon which derivatives contracts are based, the CFMA has
ensured that ... [derivatives] instruments will continue to serve an important economic
function in our financial system."). In February 2004, "the notional value of outstanding
OTC derivatives contracts [had] grown by almost [fifty] percent" and the CFTC had
designated four additional futures exchanges. Id.
185 The current authority of the CFTC officially lapsed on September 30, 2005. Even
though the last authorization period lapsed on September 30, 2000, the CFTC was not
reauthorized until December 21, 2000, by legislation embedded in the CFMA. While
reauthorization is required, there is not much pressure to pass legislation before the charter
expires because the agency's operating budget continues to be funded by Congressional
appropriation. The CFTC operated without authorization five times during its thirty-year
history, the most recent being September 30, 2000 to December 21, 2000. Lukken, supra
note 78, at 1, 3.
186 Commodity Exchange Act § 12(d), 7 U.S.C. § 16 (2004).
187 Lukken, supra note 78.
188 Id.; see also Schroeder, supra note 68. Indeed, the reauthorization legislation can
completely overhaul the CFTC's entire regulatory regime-as Congress did in the last
reauthorization, the CFMA, in 2000.
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highly contested as well as critical. 189 Current issues in the energy markets
influence the reauthorization debates.
As mentioned above, volatility and high prices in natural gas and oil
markets, and the recent surge of new speculators entering the OTC trading
business has prompted debate over the role speculative trading activity may
have played in the recent trend of higher-than-average energy prices.
Critics charge that excessive speculative trading in the energy futures and
OTC markets buoyed higher prices and volatility in the physical energy
markets, particularly in the natural gas market. 191  In 2006, numerous
politicians called for investigations into the alleged impacts of
"manipulative" energy trading on energy prices. 192  Critics charge that
prices do not reflect fundamental market conditions as a result of excessive
speculative trading in the energy futures and OTC markets, which is leading
to higher prices and volatility in the physical energy markets.' 93 According
to this theory, trading activity, particularly speculative trading, in the
relatively small futures market could leverage enough force to drive prices
in the relatively large cash security markets to unreasonable levels.
194
However, the CFTC has rebuked the charges of market malfunction
and the theory on which they were alleged. The commission has been
carefully monitoring futures markets for crude oil, unleaded gasoline and
natural gas and other energy products and has concluded that the evidence
is consistent with the notion that these markets have been properly
performing their risk management and price discovery roles.195 Moreover,
189 See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 68; Lukken, supra note 78; Press Release,
Congressman Bob Goodlatte, House Passes Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Reauthorization (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/goodlatte/
bobs%20bills%20109/CFTC/CFTC%20House.htm (describing the current CFTC
reauthorization legislation as policy-makers' most important tool for addressing energy-
market issues).
190 Some critics, particularly consumer interest groups, have attributed recent energy
prices to price manipulation by traders. See generally Sharon Brown-Hruska, Comm'r, U.S.
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Transparency in the Markets for Natural Gas:
What Is It and When Is It Enough?, Speech Before the 2006 Natural Gas Council Customer
Summit (Apr. 4, 2006), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches06/opabrownhruska-
43.htm.
191 See generally Brown-Hruska, supra note 174; see also, e.g., Edward Epstein, Oil, Gas
Trading Under Suspicion: Feinstein Fears Online Futures Market Ups Prices, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 1, 2006, at A3; Davis, supra note 162 (citing "the surge in
investor speculation" as a factor in the recent volatility of energy prices).
192 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 191 ("Feinstein's proposal is part of a blizzard of
energy-related legislation that members of Congress are pushing, as constituents react
angrily to gas prices that have risen to more than $3 a gallon in many parts of the
country .. "); Cf. Brown-Hruska, supra note 174.
193 Brown-Hruska, supra note 174.
194 Id.
195 Testimony of Walter L. Lukken, Comm'r, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
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in a speech before Washington policy-makers last year, CFTC
Commissioner Sharon Brown-Hruska responded:
The idea that a group of speculators can simply enter the market, buy
up futures positions, and sustain a long term manipulation of the
market, defies logic. For one, futures contracts have a finite life. So
whatever long or short position is established, it must be unwound
prior to the expiration of the contract. In this case, prices are
governed by the law of gravity-what goes up must come down.
Secondly, when speculators enter into futures contracts, all they have
is a price play. They do not actually have a position in the
underlying commodity, so they are not able to tie up inventories,
thereby making it unavailable to the market. Thus, their trading does
not create shortages that could serve as a mechanism to drive prices
up. This can only be accomplished in the physical markets.' 
96
Regulators continue to reject calls for market intervention and
additional regulation, rejecting market oversight by stating that speculators
in gas futures and derivatives markets cannot manipulate the physical
markets. 197 The CFTC has maintained that the link between futures markets
and commercial activity will assure that futures prices reflect information
about the underlying physical market, downplaying the impact of large
energy futures positions held by investment banks and hedge funds. r98
Other industry insiders also support this position, contending that even
aggressive speculative trading activity has affected prices only at the
extremes, with the impact mostly exhibited at the market's peaks and
valleys by pushing a trend further than it would have gone otherwise, but
even then, only small marginal increases. 99 Experts point to specific issues
Commission, Speech before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on
Agriculture (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/opa/speeches06/
opalukken-18.pdf (concluding, "Based on our surveillance efforts to date, we believe that
crude oil and gasoline futures markets have been accurately reflecting the underlying
fundamentals of these markets."); see also Brown-Hruska, supra note 174.
196 Brown-Hruska, supra note 174 (addressing the question of whether the futures
markets are "wagging" the physical markets, comparing the current concerns and issues
raised to assertions in 1987 that "program trading" in the stock index futures markets led to
the fall of stock prices, which was shown to be untrue).
197 See, e.g., CFTC, End-Users Show Split in Industry, Congress Over Issue of OTC
Oversight, Inside F.E.R.C.'s Gas Market Report, (Apr. 7, 2006) at 15.
198 Id.; Brown-Hruska, supra note 174; cf Greg Bums, Why Your Natural Gas Bills
Have Soared This Winter; Traders Take Prices On Roller-Coaster Ride, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15,
2006, at C l (noting legal and financial experts' position that even aggressive speculators can
help establish accurate prices for natural gas over time by creating excesses in the market)
(quoting Prof. Frank Partnoy, University of San Diego Law School, financial markets
corruption expert).
199 See Bums, supra note 198 (quoting head of energy products at financial services firm
on the impact of speculative traders and hedge funds in natural gas markets).
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that affected the recent market swings, including Hurricane Katrina, an
early cold snap, and cooler temperatures through the early spring,2 °° that
turned a previous supply surplus into a squeeze as usage rose and
production came under pressure.
Moreover, regulators and other industry experts stated to Congress
how natural gas prices have been driven by market fundamentals, not
manipulation, when the sharp rise in energy prices and high degree of
volatility in heating oil and natural gas futures trading prompted the House
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality to call for testimony from the
CFTC.2 °2 The Commission presented at that hearing the bases for its view
that the high futures prices and price volatility for heating oil and natural
gas at that time were indicative of market fundamentals, reflecting
expectations of market participants in a time of very tight demand-and-
supply balances for these commodities, combined with the impact of the
damage caused to the energy infrastructure by the hurricanes. °3
Certainly, it is precisely during such volatile times when the risk-
management and price-discovery features of futures markets are needed
most by commercial users of energy products. Both of these functions
would be harmed by manipulation of prices-whether by market
participants or by regulators. As such, the role of a regulator of a
derivatives market is not to influence market prices, but to ensure that the
markets are free from fraud or other abuses2 04 and regulators must be
careful not to inhibit or interfere with the proper functioning of the futures
and OTC trading markets. Thus, the critics' call for increased regulation of
natural gas markets is misguided-Congress and regulators should rely on
market mechanisms and the prices signals they emit and not attempt to
artificially influence prices.20 5
200 During the 2005 hurricane season, major hurricanes Rita and Katrina "plowed through
gas-production rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, raising the specter of severe shortages." Id. Less
than three months later, temperatures plunged across the Midwest and Northeast, where
heating demand is greatest. Id. By December 13, prices "that had hovered around $2
million per BTUs years ago" shot up to $15.78. Id.
201 Id. (noting that recent market activity follows a long period of relative inactivity and
a supply bubble that had kept prices in check in previous years).
202 Reuben Jeffery III, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Address to the American Bar Association Committee on Futures and Derivatives
Instruments: Futures and Derivatives: The Road Traveled and the Road Ahead (Feb. 3,
2006), transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches06/opajeffery-7.htm.
203 Id.
204 The CFTC's primary mission under the Commodity Exchange Act is to ensure that
the commodity futures and options markets operate in an open and competitive manner, free
of price distortions. See 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2007).
205 See Sharon Brown-Hruska, Comm'r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Speech at
the University of Houston Global Energy Management Institute: Crisis Regulation: Reacting
to High Energy Prices (Jan. 25, 2006), transcript available at
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Nonetheless, in the face of record-high gas prices and consumer
energy bills, politicians have continued to push for market investigations
and additional regulation of OTC oil and natural gas markets, citing
concerns of price manipulation. In particular, Democrats have targeted the
ICE, the largest OTC trading forum and main competitor of the NYMEX in
the energy trading market, because it qualifies as an exempt electronic
marketplace under the CFMA and thus, is exempt from direct CFTC
regulation.20 6 Interestingly, observers have noted that the proposed OTC
reporting regulations lack studied support. Senator Feinstein's webpage
includes a news article that portray the unregulated OTC derivatives traders
as surreptitious schemers who operate free of oversight.20 7 While trading
parties in the OTC market may not be subject to direct federal regulation,
they are subject to various oversight mechanisms. For instance, even
though it is an exempt commercial market, ICE is required to comply with
the access, reporting and record-keeping requirements of the CFTC.0 8 ICE
participants must qualify as eligible commercial entities as defined by the
Commodity Exchange Act, and each participant must report to the CFTC
transactional information regarding products that are subject to the CFTC's
jurisdiction and which meet specified trading volume levels. 20 9  These
sophisticated parties, such as banks, may be subject to reporting and other
requirement from other regulatory bodies.
A. The CFTC Reauthorization of 2005
Authorization for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
expired on September 30, 2005.2'0 The reauthorization will be taken up by
the 1 1 0 th Congress.
211 In previous years, the CFTC reauthorization process
has been used by Congress to consider amendments to the CEA, with the
last reauthorization resulting in the passage of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), the most significant amendment to the
http://www.bauer.uh.edu/UHGEMI/Library/0 12606/DrSharonBrown-Hruska.doc
[hereinafter Brown-Hruska, Houston Speech].
206 See ICE, The Energy Marketplace, https://www.theice.com/profile.jhtml (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007).
207 Epstein, supra note 191.208 ICE, supra note 206.
209 Id.
210 See About the CFTC, supra note 79.
211 Mark Jickling, CFTC Reauthorization, CRS Report for Congress #RS22028 (Jan. 17,
2007), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22028.pdf (noting that
both chambers considered reauthorization bills in the 109th Congress, but none was enacted.
The Senate Agriculture Committee approved S. 1566, a CFTC reauthorization bill offered by
Chairman Chambliss, on July 21, 2005. The House passed H.R. 4473 by voice vote on
December 14, 2005. The 110th Congress is expected to take up reauthorization).
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CEA since the CFTC was created in 1974.212 The CFTC reauthorization
process began with hearings in the House and Senate in March 2005, at
which representatives of the CFTC, exchanges and other futures market
representatives, representatives of OTC markets, and other witnesses all
testified that, overall, the CEA, as amended by the CFMA, is functioning
exceptionally well.213 The regulators and industry experts agreed that the
CFMA has successfully increased innovation and competition in derivatives
markets, benefiting customers and the economy as a whole by increasing
choices and lowering costs.
2 14
The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, which
was responsible for drafting the CFTC reauthorization legislation,
conducted multiple hearings and involved the Senate Banking Committee
and the PWG in the drafting process. 215 Throughout the first eight months
of the reauthorization process, no significant energy-related concerns were
raised, nor were any energy-related provisions included in the Committee's
final version of the bill, S. 1566, which incorporated the PWG's language
and was submitted to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees on
November 3, 2005.216 It was not until then that the first energy provisions
were proposed. On December 14, 2005, the House approved H.R. 4473,
which incorporated S. 1566 and added a specific provision on natural gas
markets.217
During the 2006 term, the Senate considered both S. 1566 and H.R.
4473. Consensus language that is relevant to energy trading and contained
in both bills includes amending the CEA to increase record-keeping
requirements for large traders on the exchanges and to increase civil and
criminal penalties for violations.21 8 Yet, in spite of the fact that S. 1566
212 See Jickling, supra note 211.
213 See S. REP. No. 109-119, supra note 145 (Report accompanying the Committee's
version of the reauthorization bill, S. 1566, recommending that the bill be passed).
214 Id.
215 Id. See also Frederick W. Hartfield, Comm'r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
Remarks Before the New York City Bar Association Futures and Derivatives Committee
(Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches06/opahatfield-3.htm
(recounting issues raised during hearings on the reauthorization process and the drafting of
S. 1566, which was reviewed and revised by the PWG in July 2005 and then submitted for
vote by the House and Senate on November 3, 2005).
216 See Hartfield, supra note 215 (no energy-specific provisions were proposed until after
the bill was transmitted to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees.).
217 H.R. Res. 4473, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
218 Specifically, the amendment to Section 4b contains antifraud provisions to cover
principal-to-principal off-exchange transactions, id. § 102, the amendment to Section 6
increases the maximum civil monetary penalties for manipulation and attempted
manipulation of commodity markets from $1,000 per violation to $1 million per violation,
id. § 203(a)(1), and the amendment to Section 9 increases the maximum criminal penalties
for the listed offenses (e.g., conversion, false reporting, manipulation, and attempted
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contained no energy-specific provisions, energy-market issues became the
roadblock to CFTC reauthorization. Moreover, Senator Feinstein further
mired the reauthorization process in the Senate by re-introducing the
Feinstein Amendment, which also proposed to extend record-keeping
requirements and CFTC oversight authority to exempt derivatives in OTC
markets.219  Broadly speaking, supporters argue that these disclosure and
surveillance provisions are necessary to prevent and detect manipulation in
the natural gas markets and OTC derivatives markets.220 Industry experts
maintain, however, that additional regulation is neither necessary nor
appropriate and may threaten trading participants' proprietary
information. 221 The issues involved in the two provisions are briefly
addressed below.
First, the H.R. 4473 natural gas provision charged the CFTC with
preventing and detecting manipulation of the natural gas markets, outlined
increased record-keeping requirements for large traders operating on the
exchanges, and increased the civil and criminal penalties for violations.2 22
The changes to the CFTC's current reporting system, the Commitment of
Traders Report (COT), would require the system to distinguish among the
market participants that currently comprise the category of "commercials,"
and require traders to report more detailed information, including contract
terms . According to supporters, the amendment better ensures the
transparency of the natural gas futures markets by clarifying the
surveillance and record keeping authorities of the CFTC. 224  However,
market participants and industry associations adamantly oppose the
225provision. They argue that the proposed changes to the COT system
compromise the confidentiality of privately-negotiated contracts and
manipulation) to $1 million per violation and/or ten years' imprisonment per violation, as
well as a clarification that civil and administrative actions may be brought for violations of
Section 9. Id. § 203(d).




223 H.R. Res. 4473.
224 See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman- Bob Goodlatte, House Passes Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Reauthorization (Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/goodlatte/bobs%20bills%20109/CFTC/CFTC%20House.htm ("I
believe this legislation is sound policy that will provide to consumers and end users ... a
high level of confidence that the federal government is watching the natural gas markets and
is prepared, if necessary, to take action to enforce the Commodity Exchange Act."); ef
Brown-Hruska, Houston Speech, supra note 205 ("The bad news, at least as I see it, is that
there continue to be efforts to impose more regulation on the futures and [over-the-counter]
markets for energy products-veiled in a call for greater transparency in the market.").
225 See Schroeder, supra note 68.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 27:665 (2007)
traders' proprietary information.2 26  The International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, which has successfully lobbied against similar
proposals in the past, vowed, "We'll do whatever we have to do to make
sure the natural-gas provision won't pass.' 227
Second, the Feinstein Amendment, which Senator Feinstein has been
advocating for nearly five years, proposed to extend the CFTC's regulatory
authority to OTC transactions in exempt derivatives. 228 The legislation
would have authorized the CFTC to monitor exempt-derivative trading
transactions on online exchanges much like it does on the futures exchanges
and would have required traders on online exchanges to keep trading
records for five years and to provide them to the CFTC or DOJ upon
demand.2 29
Like the natural gas amendment, industry groups, regulators, and
market experts oppose Senator Feinstein's efforts to expand the CFTC's
regulatory authority into the OTC markets.2 30  Following Senator
Feinstein's proposal of the amendment in January 2006, CFTC
Commissioner Sharon Brown-Hruska responded, reporting to energy
trading policy makers and industry leaders, that "The efforts to impose
additional requirements on market participants are misguided. Yes, energy
prices are high and volatile. But the measures being proposed, some of
which have gained favor in Congress, will do little to reign in prices and
could actually lead to more volatility in the markets."
231
Led by futures and derivatives trade groups, industry opponents
lobbied both Republican and Democrat Senators, CFTC commissioners and
staff, and Treasury and Federal Reserve officials. 232 Industry opponents
argued that providing the CFTC with greater oversight authority over the
OTC market would cause an exodus of U.S. trading business to less-
regulated foreign markets.23 3 Moreover, the Futures Industry Association
(FIA), which represents commodity exchanges, futures traders and banks,
said the CFTC has neither the authority nor the resources to police and
investigate OTC transactions, and that instead, federal prosecutors should
be responsible for filing criminal cases against violators.2 34 The CFTC
226 See Reuben Jeffery III, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Speech
Before the Futures Industry Association (Mar. 16, 2006) available at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches06/opajeffery-10.htm.
227 Schroeder, supra note 68.
228 Epstein, supra note 191 (discussing he CFTC's current market surveillance and
enforcement procedures).
229 Id.
230 Schroeder, supra note 68.






publicly agreed with the FIA's position. Renouncing proposals to extend
its authority to OTC commodity markets, CFTC Chairman Reuben Jeffery
stated in March 2006 that "the CFTC has no interest, ability or desire to
regulate over-the-counter commodities markets" and is not looking to
expand its oversight authority into those areas either.235
The dispute over the provisions constrained reauthorization in the
Senate. While Senate leaders anticipated holding a floor vote on a version
of one of the bills by June 2006, a lack of sufficient agreement to assure
passage prevented them from introducing a vote held before the session
ended.23  If Congress is deadlocked once again this term, a group of
presidential advisers that includes the chiefs of the Federal Reserve Board,
Treasury Department, SEC and CFTC, may end up being the final arbiter.
In addition to the CFTC's rejection of additional authority over the OTC
markets, the Federal Reserve Board and Treasury Department have raised
objections to any such regulation of OTC transactions, based on fears that it
could cause legal uncertainty and breed lawsuits that could disrupt the
market.237 Moreover, officials from these agencies have opposed similar
legislation in the last five years. For example, in September 2002-in the
thick of fraud and manipulation investigations-the then-Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, Secretary of the Treasury, SEC Chairman, and
CFTC Chairman expressed "serious concerns" about a legislative proposal
to extend CFTC regulation to OTC energy and metals derivatives. In
their letter to the Senate, the officials objected to disclosure and capital
requirements and stated, "We do not believe a public policy case exists to
justify this governmental intervention., 239 The officials further warned that
the proposed requirements could duplicate or conflict with existing
regulations. 240 Thus, if these advisers have the final say, it appears likely
that the amendments will not pass. However, the ultimate fates of both the
natural gas amendment and the Feinstein Amendment remain undecided at
this point, as supporters have pledged to reintroduce the substantive
provisions this term.
235 CFTC to Not Regulate OTC Commodity Markets, MEGAWATr DAILY, Mar. 16, 2006,
at 10.
236 Schroeder, supra note 68.
237 Id. (referring to recent letters to members of Congress from these entities).
238 See Greenspan, Others Oppose Expanded OTC Rules, 19 GAs DAILY 182 (Sept. 23,
2002) (opposing a draft amendment to a bill by Senator Feinstein that would have basically
overturned the CFMA's exemption for energy and metals derivatives and require traders to
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B. The PUMP ACT
As the Senate struggled with the CFTC Reauthorization Act, and oil
prices set record highs, 24 1 another bill seeking to regulate OTC energy
markets, the Prevent Unfair Manipulation of Prices Act of 2006 ("PUMP
Act"), was introduced by Congressman Stupak in the House of
Representatives at the onset of the new 2007 session.242 The PUMP Act is
marketed as a means of establishing transparency in the OTC oil market,
which would "require off-market speculators to play by the same rules as
speculators who participate in on-market trading already do, 243 and could
"reduce the price of crude oil by as much as $20 a barrel.",244 Specifically,
the PUMP Act would affect OTC trading in more than eight energy
markets, including natural gas, by requiring OTC counterparties (currently
exempted by the CEA) to provide the CFTC, on demand, with up to five
years of books and trading records.245 The PUMP Act would also increase
penalties for market manipulation.246 The PUMP Act has been cosponsored
by twenty-two other representatives and has been referred to the House
Committee on Agriculture. 247 As the newly-elected Chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee's Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee, Congressman Stupak has pledged to make energy issues a
key focus of his Subcommittee's work in coming months.
C. Oil and Gas Traders Oversight Act
In April, 2006, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced the Oil and Gas
Traders Oversight Act ("OGTOA") with Senators Olympia Snowe, Carl
Levin, and Maria Cantwell.248 Since the Act was not voted on before the
close of the legislative session, Senator Feinstein reintroduced the bill in the
current legislative session on February 13, 2007.249 The bill seeks to add to
241 Since the beginning of 2005, U.S. retail gasoline prices have been generally
increasing, with the average price of regular gasoline rising from $1.78 per gallon on January
3 to as high as $3.07 per gallon on September 5, 2005. See Energy Information
Administration, A Primer on Gasoline Prices, http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/
brochures/gasolinepricesprimer/eial2005primerM.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
242 Press Release, Congressman Bart Stupak, Stupak Re-Introduces PUMP Act (Jan. 19,




245 See H.R. 594, 110th Cong. (2007).
246 See id.
247 See Bill tracking, H.R. 594, http://www.thomas.gov (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (the
22 supporters include the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, John
Dingell, another Democrat from Michigan).
248 See S. 2642, 109th Cong. (2006).
249 See Bill Tracking for S. 577 IS, http://www.thomas.gov.
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the CEA special recordkeepin% and reporting requirements for positions
involving energy commodities. 0 The proposed provisions would affect
businesses that trade coal, crude oil, gasoline, heating oil, diesel fuel,
electricity, propane, and natural gas in the OTC markets, on exempt
electronic trading facilities, and on regulated futures exchanges. 25' The bill
is supposed to "increase transparency in the energy markets by giving the
CFTC the means to effectively exercise its existing anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation authority over energy commodities traded on U.S.
exchanges.252  Similar to Senator Feinstein's proposed natural gas
amendment to the CFTC reauthorization Act of 2005, OGTOA would
mandate the CFTC adopt a rule that any person holding, maintaining or
controlling any position in any certain contracts must maintain such records
as directed by the CFTC, and to be produced on demand to the CFTC or the
Department of Justice, for a period of five years or longer.253 Additionally,
the CFTC would be required to adopt a system for requiring the regular or
continuous reporting of positions in certain contracts.254 Despite support
from numerous co-sponsors, the bill never went to a vote before the 2006
session ended.2 5
Industry groups and leaders that oppose the OGTOA maintain that the
reporting requirements are not only unnecessary, in light of existing CEA
provisions, but also potentially detrimental to the industry, in that the costs
of implementation and compliance would outweigh the Act's potential
benefits.256 These critics note that the CFTC has demonstrated that it has
adequate authority and the ability to police the false reporting and attempted
manipulation of energy prices, under CEA.257 They also note the CFTC's
collection of fines over the past five years in excess of $300 million.258
D. Recent Industry Response to Calls for Additional Natural Gas
Legislation
In February 2006, FERC Commissioner Nora Brownell testified before
250 See S. 2642, 109th Cong. (2006).
251 Id.
252 Senator Dianne Feinstein's Website, http://feinstein.senate.gov (last visited Mar. 28,
2007).
253 See S. 2642, 109th Cong. (2006).
254 See id.
255 The Library of Congress, Thomas Registry twice referred to Committee 4/25/2006.
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.02642 (last visited Mar. 28,
2007).
256 See, e.g., Who Has the Energy to Generate More Records?, Futures & Derivatives
Law Report, Sept. 2006.
257 See Commodity Exchange Act, § 9, available at http://www.law.comell.edu/
uscode/7/uscsec_07_00000009 ---- 000-.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
258 Id.
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the Senate on "the critical issues in the natural gas market and recent trends
of increasingly high and volatile prices. 259 In her testimony, Brownell
emphasized market fundamentals to explain the high prices and volatility,
including inadequate infrastructure, depletions and disruptions in natural
gas supply over the past few years, and the inextricable link between
electric prices (which are most perceptible to consumers) and the natural
gas market.260 Brownell rebuked the temptation to politicize the debate on
high energy prices, stating that "unfortunately, we all too often find it more
comfortable to blame the high energy prices on unprecedented natural
catastrophes, market manipulation, or revelations of cororate malfeasance
instead of addressing the underlying economic issues." It appears that
the industry and regulators may have also exercised the contention that the
CFTC has adequate authority and tools to oversee the OTC markets and
monitor natural gas markets to prevent price manipulation. In November
2006, the Intercontinental Exchange, (ICE), the leading global, electronic
marketplace for trading both futures and OTC energy contracts, announced
it began reporting to the CFTC.262 The CFTC exercised its authority under
the CFM to request that the exchange begin submitting trading reports for
certain markets, including natural gas contracts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Enron's collapse and the crisis in the California wholesale power
markets severely weakened the developing wholesale and retail electricity
markets. Yet those experiences underscored the more critical risk to the
viability of the development of competitive wholesale and retail power
markets in the United States-regulatory uncertainty caused by inconsistent
legal standards governing energy trading practices. Clear trading rules are a
critical component to an efficient commodity market. However, proposed
regulatory requirements would disrupt the legal certainty achieved by the
CFMA that is fundamental to the growth and stability of all derivatives
trading markets.263 Moreover, when evaluating regulatory concerns, it is
important to consider Enron's truly unique role in the energy trading
markets. Enron was fortuitously positioned in the rise of the energy trading
industry by a combination of its own innovation and strategy and favorable
259 Volatility In the Natural Gas Market: The Impact Of High Natural Gas Prices On
American Consumers, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Nora Brownell, Comm'r, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n), available at
http://ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20060216145159-Nora-Brownell-02-13-06.pdf.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 3.
262 See ICE, ICE Statement on Reporting to the CFTC (Jan. 19, 2007),
https://www.theice.com/showpr.jhtml?id-5066.
263 Kramer, Pantano, & Ezickson, supra note 18, at 107.
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legislative and market conditions, such that at the height of its success,
Enron dominated as both a provider and consumer of trading products and
services. 2 4  Yet Enron went to great lengths to ensure that its trading
continued to escape regulation-one reason why it was such a heavy
contributor to political campaigns.265 Enron confined itself to unregulated
markets and was not classified as a bank, insurer or fund manager, shrewdly
positioning the company to achieve something unavailable to any other
leading dealer in derivatives contracts-complete exemption of its activities
from federal supervision and oversight.266
Nevertheless, Enron's exceptional position was not only
unprecedented, but also unlikely to be duplicated.267 Certainly, the post-
CFMA growth of the OTC derivatives markets has resulted in many
financial businesses transacting on a large scale in those trading markets,
which are free from exchange and CFTC regulation. However, after
Enron's departure the energy trading industry restructured and is now
dominated by investment banks, insurance companies and other regulated
entities that transact on independent trading platforms.268  Unlike Enron,
these entities, as deposit-taking institutions, insurance companies or fund
managers, are supervised under one or more federal regulatory schemes.
This provides oversight and disclosure of these companies' financial
viability, mitigating many of the concerns involved in Enron's startling
269collapse. Moreover, the futures and OTC markets are necessarily
interdependent 270 and as such, even entities such as hedge funds that do not
fall within banking, insurance or financial intermediary regulations, can still
find that aspects of their OTC trading activities are subject to oversight.
27'
264 Neves, supra note 10.
265 See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TuL. L.
Rev. 1275, 1279-80 (2002) (stating that Enron spent copiously on politics and "obtained
good results from such investments." Senator Phil Gramm, the spouse of one of Enron's
directors, "assured that the [CFMA] included the 'Enron Point,' a complete exclusion for
energy trading companies from capital or disclosure requirements respecting portfolios of
over-the-counter derivatives securities [sic]," thereby "achieving something available to no
other leading dealer in derivatives contracts-complete exemption of its activities from
federal supervision and oversight.").
266 Id.
267 See Neves, supra note 10.
268 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 162.
269 Cf Bratton, supra note 265; Energy White Paper, supra note 5 (highlighting the
importance of being able to evaluate and manage credit risk among trading parties).
270 See Brown-Hruska, supra note 174 (noting the interdependency and linked functions
of futures and over-the-counter markets).
27 1 As an example, hedge funds are essentially fund managers that have too few investors
to fall into the regulatory net, but when they transact business on regulated exchanges-
buying and selling futures, for example-their trades pass through regulated brokers. That
brings much of their activities, if not the funds themselves, within the scope of regulation.
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Finally, the development and regulation of clearing systems for OTC
trading platforms has dramatically mitigated credit risk and enhanced
stability of OTC trading, facilitating the CFTC's fundamental objectives
more efficiently than externally-imposed regulation. 2
In sum, Enron's collapse created high sensitivity to the notion of
market abuse and brought heightened scrutiny to energy deregulation,
energy derivatives, and credit issues within the market. This skepticism
resulted in a fundamental loss of confidence in the energy trading industry
and regulation.273 While the industry has made progress, that distrust and
loss of confidence has not been completely overcome and continues to
influence current industry issues and regulatory debates. However, the
regulatory scheme enacted in the CFMA has succeeded in facilitating
innovation and competition across the energy derivatives industry, enabling
the market to emerge from the post-Enron downturn more efficient and
solid than before.
274
FT Report, supra note 63.
272 Cf S. Rep. No. 109-119, supra note 145 (testimony of ICE President on how the
CFMA helped his company); Herron, supra note 146 (describing how the online trading
markets have innovated and emerged stronger and with more safeguards against industry
risks and manipulation). The ICE, which has now emerged as the largest OTC energy
derivatives market, offers clearing, oversight and other safeguards for market participants.
273 See Kramer, Pantano & Ezickson, supra note 18, at 106-09. Rapid growth, inadequate
credit and risk management controls, a poorly designed California energy market and the
Enron bankruptcy all contributed to this loss of confidence in energy trading markets. See
Energy White Paper, supra note 5.
274 Cf Herron, supra note 146, at 143; Elizabeth Rigby, CFTC Chief Ready For Change,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2004), available at 2004 WLNR 9715584 (describing the U.S. futures
industry as "more competitive now than ever before," as a result of the CFMA's impact on
over-the-counter derivatives and competition from European futures exchanges).
